Professor of Economics
Montreal, QC, Canada
Optimal majority rule in referenda, joint with Qingqing Cheng, 2019, 10, 25, Games, 23 pages.
“Reputation-Concerned Policy Makers and Institutional Status Quo Bias,” with Qiang Fu, 2014, 110, 15-25, Journal of Public Economics.
“Advice from Multiple Experts: A Comparison of Simultaneous, Sequential, and Hierarchical Communication,” 2010, 10 (1), 22 pages, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (Topics), Article 18.
“A Psychologically-Based Model of Voter Turnout,” with Dipjyoti Majumdar, 2010, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 12(5), pages 979-1002, October.
“Information Collection in Bargaining,” 2009, 38(4), 481-498, International Journal of Game Theory.
“When Mandatory Disclosure Hurts: Expert Advice and Conflicting Interests,” with Kristof Madarasz, 2008, 139(1), 47-74, Journal of Economic Theory.
“Two (Talking) Heads May Not Be Better Than One,” 2008, 3(63), 1-8, Economics Bulletin.
“The Role of the Policy Advisor: An Insider’s Look (review).” Canadian Public Policy, vol. 35 no. 4, 2009, pp. 518-519. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/cpp.0.0043
Persuasion bias in science: An experiment on strategic sample selection, joint with Arianna Degan and Huan Xie, submitted.
Group formation and diversity, joint with Sourav Bhattacharya.
Reputation-concerned policy makers and institution design, joint with Qiang Fu, published in Journal of Public Economics.
Information transmission in political campaigns, joint with Arianna Degan.
Credibility for sale, joint with Tymofiy Mylovanov.